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The best arguments for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem all require
that when Beauty awakes on Monday she should be uncertain what day it is. I argue
that this claim should be rejected, thereby clearing the way to accept the 1/2 solution.
1 Inertia and Sleeping Beauty
If on Monday you confidently and rationally believe that Slippery Slim is guilty, and
from Monday to Tuesday you gain no new relevant evidence, then, quite plausibly,
on Tuesday you should remain equally confident that Slippery Slim is guilty. Lots of
evidence might be relevant: that Slim has an impeccable alibi, that the informant who
fingered Slim is unreliable, that Mournful Mel has confessed to the crime, that your
biases have clouded your judgment, and so on. But if you learn nothing at all relevant
to your confident belief that Slim is guilty, then surely you should remain confident
that Slim is guilty.
Perhaps that was too quick. Suppose you lose some relevant evidence— say you
forget why you became convinced that Slim is guilty— then perhaps you should be-
come less confident that he is guilty. Or maybe your confidence should change if your
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cognitive faculties are damaged or disrupted. Still, the following principle is intuitively
plausible:
inertia If you should have degree of belief d that p at time t1, and between t1 and
a later time t2, your cognitive faculties remain in order, and you neither gain nor lose
relevant evidence, then you should also have degree of belief d that p at time t2.
Inertia comes into play in the much discussed Sleeping Beauty problem.
On Sunday, Sleeping Beauty[10] is informed that after she goes to sleep that evening
a fair coin will be tossed. If the coin lands heads, she will be awakened for a moment
on Monday, put back to sleep, and then not awakened until Wednesday morning. If the
coin lands tails, Beauty will be awakened for a moment on Monday, and put back to
sleep. While sleeping, her memory of the Monday awakening will be erased. Then, on
Tuesday, she will be awakened for a moment, put back to sleep and not awakened until
Wednesday morning. Whether the coin lands heads or tails, on Wednesday morning
she will be awakened and immediately informed that the experiment is over.
When Beauty wakes on Monday, what should be her degree of belief that the coin
lands heads? Thirders say 1/3. Halfers say 1/2. Puzzlingly, there are strong arguments
on both sides.
A compelling argument for the halfer’s view relies on inertia. When Beauty awak-
ens on Monday she learns nothing relevant to the coin toss. She does learn that she
is awake, but surely that news is not relevant to the coin toss. As Roger White puts
it, “[s]he knew all along that she was to be awakened briefly during the experiment at
some time. So it is no news to her when she finds herself awake at an unknown time.
When awakened she may learn something that she would express as ‘I am awake now.’
But it is difficult at best to see what bearing this could have for her on whether the
coin landed heads.”[34] Moreover, Beauty does not forget anything between Sunday
and Monday, and she does not lose evidence in any other way. Nor does she suffer any
disruption in her cognitive faculties. Strange happenings do occur on Monday night, if
the coin lands tails. But from Sunday to Monday morning, nothing of the sort occurs.
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Now, since Beauty knew that the coin was fair, on Sunday she should have degree of
belief 1/2 that the coin lands heads. (This is an application of David Lewis’ Principal
Principle connecting chance to credence.) So, by inertia, when she wakes up she
should continue to have degree of belief 1/2 that the coin lands heads.
Thirders[1][8][10][14][15][26][29][32] agree with halfers that on Sunday Beauty should
have degree of belief 1/2 that the coin lands heads. However, thirders think that
Beauty’s degree of belief should change to 1/3 when she wakes up on Monday.
The thirder view thus appears incompatible with inertia: Beauty’s degree of belief
that the coin lands heads should change from Sunday to Monday, although she suffers
no cognitive disruptions, and she neither gains nor loses relevant evidence.
Despite appearances, few thirders reject inertia. Many thirders think Beauty
gains some relevant evidence upon awakening on Monday.1 Some thirders instead (or
additionally) hold that, despite appearances, Beauty loses relevant evidence.
Indeed, a thirder can use inertia to argue that Beauty gains relevant evidence:
since she should change her degree of belief, she does not forget anything (or lose
relevant evidence in some other way) and she suffers no cognitive disruption, it follows,
given inertia, that she gains relevant evidence. But it is one thing to argue that
Beauty gains relevant evidence, and quite another to explain how that evidence is
relevant. With a satisfactory explanation how that evidence is relevant, thirders might
blunt the force of the halfer reasoning, thereby resolving the puzzle.
However, no explanation how that evidence is relevant has seen wide acceptance;
the Sleeping Beauty problem still rankles. Indeed, as I will discuss, the best developed
attempt at such an explanation fails. Moreover, as I will explain later, there isn’t good
reason to think that Beauty loses relevant evidence either.
My goal is to resolve the Sleeping Beauty problem in favor of the halfer view. As
I will explain, the best thirder arguments require a common assumption. I will argue
1e.g. Horgan[15], Weintraub[32], and Stalnaker[29]
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that we have better reason to reject this assumption than we have to conclude that
Beauty gains relevant evidence or that she loses relevant evidence (or that inertia is
false). Once the assumption is rejected, these thirder arguments can be set aside, and
the path is open to be a halfer. But before identifying the common assumption, it
will be useful to clarify some background issues, and then ask a non-standard question
about Sleeping Beauty’s situation.
2 Background
I assume that all agree that when Beauty wakes up on Monday, she should divide her
credence among at least some of the following propositions:
HMON : The coin lands heads and it is now Monday
TMON : The coin lands tails and it is now Monday
TTUE : The coin lands tails and it is now Tuesday
Let P() represent the credences Beauty should have when she wakes up on Monday,
HEADS be the proposition that the coin lands heads, TAILS be the proposition that
the coin lands tails, MON be the proposition that it is now Monday, and TUE be the
proposition that it is now Tuesday. I assume that all agree that:
P (HMON ) + P (TMON ) + P (TTUE) = 1
P (HEADS) = P (HMON )
P (TAILS) = P (TMON ) + P (TTUE)
P (MON) = P (HMON ) + P (TMON )
P (TUE) = P (TTUE).
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3 An optimistic answer to a different question
Thirders and halfers disagree about Beauty’s degree of belief, on Monday morning,
that the coin lands heads; thirders and halfers disagree about P (HEADS). Is it 1/3
as thirders claim? Or 1/2 as halfers say? But consider a second question: when Beauty
wakes up on Monday what should be her degree of belief that it is Monday? That is,
what is P (MON)? Little attention has been paid to this second question.
It is an unquestioned assumption in the literature on the Sleeping Beauty problem
that when Beauty awakes on Monday she should be uncertain about what day it is, that
is that 0 < P (MON) < 1. It is not surprising that this assumption is unquestioned.
For imagine yourself in Beauty’s shoes as you awake on Monday morning. “I have no
idea whether it is Monday or Tuesday!” you might think to yourself. It might seem to
you that you have no evidence which indicates that it is now Monday as opposed to
Tuesday. It seems intuitively obvious that you should have at least some uncertainty
about the day. However, we should not agree that 0 < P (MON) < 1 merely on the
basis of brute intuition. It is not clear that our intuitions about such a bizarre situation
are reliable. We need to rely on reasoning here, not brute intuition.
Let us question the unquestioned assumption. Suppose Beauty adopts the following
optimistic policy: believe to degree 1 that it is Monday whenever awakened during the
experiment. If Beauty is an optimist, whether the coin lands heads or tails, when
awakened on Monday she will have full credence in the truth that it is Monday. If the
coin lands heads, she will never be wrong about the day during the experiment. If the
coin lands tails, on Tuesday she will also believe to degree 1 that it is Monday, and
thus have full credence in a falsehood.
To explore the plausibility of the optimistic policy, recall her unusual situation: if
there are two awakenings, her memory of the Monday awakening is erased on Monday
evening. A straightforward way to understand the memory erasure is this: on Monday
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evening Beauty’s belief state is reset to what it was just before she fell asleep on
Sunday evening.2 The result of the erasure, I take it, is that for any proposition p,
if, on Monday, Beauty has degree belief d that p, then on Tuesday, Beauty (if she is
awakened) has the same degree of belief d that p. Thus, if the coin lands tails, then
both on Monday and on Tuesday Beauty has, for example, the same degree of belief
that it is Monday, and the same degree of belief that the coin lands heads. In short,
her degrees of belief are yoked together between Monday and Tuesday, if she awakens
on Tuesday.3,4
If the coin lands tails, the yoking of her degrees of belief means that the higher her
degree of belief, on Monday, in the truth that it is Monday, the higher her degree of
belief, on Tuesday, in the falsehood that it is Monday. In a certain sense, being closer
to the truth on Monday brings the possible cost of being farther from the truth on
Tuesday. This is an odd situation. Beauty is barred from the epistemically desirable
goal of both believing to degree 1 that it is Monday on Monday, and believing to
degree 0 that it is Monday on Tuesday. In this odd situation the best compromise,
with respect to the claim that it is Monday, might well be to believe to degree 1 that it
is Monday whenever she awakens. She will be surely be right on Monday, and possibly
never be wrong about the day during the experiment.5
2Indeed this is how Elga[10] describes the memory erasure.
3If a yoked degree of belief changes while Beauty is awake on Monday, that degree of belief is to change
similarly on Tuesday (if she is awakened on Tuesday).
4As the case is sometimes described, Beauty’s experiences on Monday and Tuesday are phenomenally
indistinguishable. If she sees a triangular shadow on the wall on Monday, she sees a triangular shadow on the
wall on Tuesday. If she hears a passing airplane on Monday, she hears a passing airplane on Tuesday. And
so on. As several have noted (e.g. Kierland and Monton[20], Stalnaker[29] and Titelbaum[30]), the puzzle
remains even if her experiences are not phenomenally indistinguishable, as long as the difference between
her experiences provide no evidence about propositions of interest— such as propositions about the coin
toss or the current day. One can accommodate this observation by yoking together degrees of belief only for
propositions of interest as opposed to all propositions.
5One might attempt to formalize and thereby clarify this thought that optimism is the best compromise
by using a scoring rule. However, an initial attempt is inconclusive. According to some scoring rules (for
example a linear rule), P (MON) = 1, but by other scoring rules (for example Brier’s rule) P (MON) 6= 1.
It is unclear which rule to apply in this case, and moreover, it is unclear how to calculate the score for
Beauty’s unusual circumstance. Kierland and Monton[20] have approached the Sleeping Beauty problem by
using a scoring rule. They do not reach a single conclusive answer. They use Brier’s rule to measure the
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Although suggestive, these thoughts are obviously not sufficient to show that Beauty
should adopt the optimistic policy. I will later present an argument that P (MON) = 1.
At the moment, I merely conclude that the claim that P (MON) = 1 should not be
immediately rejected. So let us accept P (MON) = 1 as temporary working hypothesis.
Given that hypothesis, we next see what goes wrong with the best thirder arguments.
4 Problems with two thirder arguments
According to thirders, P (HEADS) = 1/3. Two of the best arguments6 rely on the
key premise
(EQ) P (HMON ) = P (TMON ) = P (TTUE).
For from (EQ) and
P (HMON ) + P (TMON ) + P (TTUE) = 1
it follows that P (HMON ) = 1/3, and given that
P (HEADS) = P (HMON )
it follows that P (HEADS) = 1/3, the thirder’s conclusion.
Given the agreed assumptions (in Section 2), optimism is incompatible with the key
premise (EQ): if P (MON) = 1, then P (HMON ) 6= P (TMON ) or P (TMON ) 6= P (TTUE)
(or both).
But what, in the eyes of the optimist, is wrong with thirder arguments for (EQ)?
4.1 Elga’s defense of (EQ)
Elga[10] defends (EQ) by arguing both that P (HMON ) = P (TMON ), and that P (TMON ) =
P (TTUE). The optimist need have no quarrel with Elga’s argument for the former: Sup-
expected inaccuracy of Beauty’s degree of belief that the coin lands heads. They argue that if expected total
inaccuracy is calculated the answer is 1/2, and if expected average inaccuracy is used, the answer is 1/3.
They don’t mention that other plausible scoring rules yield yet other answers.
6by Elga[10], and by Arntzenius[1][2] and Dorr[8]
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pose, after awakening on Monday, Beauty is told that it is Monday. At that point her
degree of belief that the coin lands heads should be 1/2, for her degree of belief that
the coin lands heads should be the same as the chance of the future event that the coin
lands heads. (This is another application of the Principal Principle.)7 But when she is
told that it is Monday, Beauty should revise her degrees of belief by conditionalization.
In particular, her new degree of belief that HMON should be P (HMON/MON). So
P (HMON/MON) = 1/2, and it follows that P (HMON ) = P (TMON ).
The error— from the point of view of the optimist— lies in Elga’s defense of the
other claim, that P (TMON ) = P (TTUE). Elga reasons like this: suppose when Beauty
wakes up Monday that she is informed that the coin landed tails. She thus learns
that either TMON or TTUE is true. Since she has no reason to favor TMON over
TTUE , or TTUE over TMON , she should divide her credence equally between TTUE
and TMON . According to Elga, this is an application of a “highly restricted principle
of indifference”. Since Beauty should update her beliefs by conditionalization, after
learning that the coin landed tails her credence in TMON ought to be the same as
the conditional credence P (TMON |TMON or TTUE), and her credence in TTUE ought
to be the same as the conditional credence P (TTUE |TMON or TTUE). It follows that
P (TMON |TMON or TTUE) = P (TTUE |TMON or TTUE), and therefore P (TMON ) =
P (TTUE).
The optimist does not accept this reasoning. One of Elga’s claims is that Beauty
should divide her credence equally between TTUE and TMON after learning TAILS. If
so, then Beauty’s credence in MON after learning TAILS should be less than 1. For
if she should divide her credence equally between TTUE and TMON , then her credence
in TMON should be less than 1, and, therefore, her credence in MON should be less
than 1.
7We assume that, whether the coin toss occurs on Monday evening or Sunday evening, there is no
difference to Beauty’s credences.
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However, Elga also claims that after learning TAILS her credence in TMON ought
to be the same as her conditional credence P (TMON |TMON or TTUE). If so, and if
Beauty should have degree of belief 1 that it is Monday when she awakens, then upon
learning TAILS, Beauty’s credence that it is Monday ought to remain 1.
So, on pain of accepting that on learning TAILS Beauty should both have degree
of belief 1 that it is Monday, and have degree of belief lower than 1 that it is Monday,
the advocate of optimism should not accept both of Elga’s claims.
It is open to the optimist to reject Elga’s view that after learning TAILS Beauty’s
credence in TMON ought to be the same as her conditional credence P (TMON |TMON
or TTUE). But this would seem to be an ad hoc departure from standard conditional-
ization.
A better route for the optimist is to reject Elga’s claim that Beauty should divide
her credence equally between TTUE and TMON after learning TAILS; the optimist
should reject Elga’s “highly restricted” indifference principle.8
4.2 Arntzenius and Dorr’s argument for (EQ)
Arntzenius and Dorr argue for (EQ) in a different way. They consider a variation of the
original scenario: if the coin lands heads, Beauty is awakened on Tuesday, but a few
moments after the awakening Beauty is given an unusual experience which indicates to
her that it is Tuesday and the coin landed heads. The argument goes that when Beauty
8More formally, the principle, developed and defended in [11], is that similar centered worlds deserve
equal credence. A centered world is a possible world with a designated time and individual. Different
centered worlds X and Y are similar just in case X and Y are associated with the same possible world,
and the designated individual of X (at the designated time) is in a state subjectively indistinguishable from
the designated individual of Y (at the designated time). The problem with Elga’s defense of the principle,
from the perspective of the optimist, is that Elga argues, in effect, that if one should have at least some
credence both in X and in similar world Y, then one should have equal credence in X and Y. But to defend
the principle it needs to be further shown that if one should have at least some credence in X then one
should have at least some credence in any possible world similar to X. However, the optimist thinks that it
is rational to have credence in TMON but no credence in the similar TTUE . The optimist would be in good
company in rejecting the indifference principle: see [31] for detailed criticism of Elga’s view; Stalnaker [p.c.]
has different reasons to worry about the application of this principle.
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is awakened on Monday, she should initially divide her credence equally among four
possibilities: P ′(HMON ) = P ′(TMON ) = P ′(HTUE) = P ′(TTUE). After waiting and
failing to have the unusual experience, she is able to rule out HTUE . Since she should
update her beliefs by conditionalization, her revised credences should be divided equally
among the three remaining possibilities: P ′′(HMON ) = P ′′(TMON ) = P ′′(TTUE). Her
situation now is relevantly like her situation in the original scenario, so (EQ) is true
for the original scenario.
Again the optimist should not accept this reasoning. The optimist might hold
that after waiting and failing to have the unusual experience, Beauty should not use
conditionalization to update her beliefs. But this would seem to be an ad hoc departure
from standard conditionalization.
A better route for the optimist is to deny that when Beauty fails to have the unusual
experience she merely learns that HTUE is not true. The optimist may contend that
she learns something else, something relevant to what degree of belief she should have
that it is Monday. She learns that she is in a situation like the original scenario. But,
says the optimist, in the original scenario she should have degree of belief 1 that it is
Monday. Thus, when Beauty fails to have the unusual experience she learns MON .
So, she should not revise her credences by conditionalizing on not-HTUE . She should
conditionalize on the strongest proposition learned, MON .9
5 Another thirder argument
Michael Titelbaum[30] presents a different argument for the thirder view. Titel-
baum develops a formal framework for rational belief revision which, unlike the simple
Bayesian rule of updating by conditionalization, can model cases when a degree of
belief changes from an extreme value (0 or 1) to a non-extreme value. However, we
9Another possibility for the optimist is (like Bradley[5]) to deny that her situation in the revised story is
relevantly like her situation in the original story.
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need not examine the details to note that as Titelbaum tells the story, when Beauty
awakens she is “uncertain whether it is Monday or Tuesday”. And when he formalizes
what he calls the “Extrasystematic constraints” of the story, one explicit constraint is
that 0 < P (MON) < 1. Thus, Titelbaum simply assumes that P (MON) 6= 1.10
Perhaps Titelbaum— or any other thirder— would insist that the claim that
0 < P (MON) < 1 is simply a stipulation. Isn’t one free to stipulate anything one
likes?
In reply: One can certainly stipulate that Beauty has a non-extreme degree of
belief that it is Monday when she wakes up on Monday. But that is not enough for
the thirder’s needs. The thirder needs to make the case that Beauty should have a
non-extreme degree of belief that it is Monday.
To see why, compare the following case. Stipulate that on Sunday, Confused Cal has
degree of belief 1/3 that Cleveland won the pennant. Also stipulate that on Monday,
Cal has degree of belief 1/2 that Cleveland won the pennant, and that between Sunday
and Monday, Cal doesn’t lose relevant evidence, doesn’t gain relevant evidence, and
his cognitive faculties remain in order.
Does the case of Cal show that inertia is false? Clearly not. Now revise the case
by removing the phrase “doesn’t gain relevant evidence” from the previous paragraph.
Does the revised case show that, given inertia, Cal gains relevant evidence? Again,
clearly not. Cal might gain no relevant evidence, and might have degree of belief 1/2
on Monday as stipulated, but it might not be that he should have that degree of belief.
In order to justifiably conclude that Cal gains relevant evidence, an argument is needed
10Curiously Titelbaum is unusual in making this assumption explicit. When the Sleeping Beauty puzzle
was introduced to the philosophical literature by Elga[10], the case was described without any mention of
Beauty’s degrees of belief about the day when she wakes. Nor does Lewis[22], one of the earliest halfers,
mention any such thing. Later, something crept into the presentation of the situation. Dorr[8] says that
when she awakes she “will not be able to tell that it is not Monday” and then assumes without argument
that P (MON) 6= 1. Hitchcock[14] says that when she wakes up she “will not know whether it is Monday
or Tuesday”. But many others, when describing the case, do not explicitly mention anything about Beauty
being uncertain about the day when she awakes.[1][13][15][25][26][32][34]
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that Cal should have degree of belief 1/2 on Monday. Merely stipulating that he has
degree of belief 1/2 is not sufficient.
The lesson here applies to Beauty. Suppose one stipulates that she has degree of
belief < 1 that it is Monday when she wakes up on Monday. And, for the sake of
argument, suppose that it then follows (given well accepted principles and the other
stipulations about the case) that she has degree of belief 1/3 on Monday that the coin
lands heads. Should one conclude by inertia that Beauty gains relevant evidence? No.
Beauty might gain no relevant evidence, and might have degree of belief < 1 that it is
Monday when she wakes up on Monday, but it might not be that she should have that
degree of belief. In order to justifiably conclude that Beauty gains relevant evidence,
an argument is needed that Beauty should have degree of belief < 1 that it is Monday
when she wakes up on Monday. Merely stipulating that she has degree of belief < 1 is
not sufficient.
6 A Dutch book
Let us consider one last thirder argument. Some thirders support their view using a
diachronic Dutch book. Although the force of such arguments is debatable,11 it will
be instructive to discuss a recent example offered by Draper and Pust[9]. Note that
Draper and Pust discuss a slightly different version of the Sleeping Beauty case. This
version is just like the original, except that on Monday afternoon Beauty is told that it
is Monday. Let us suppose that this additional element does not affect what Beauty’s
degree of belief should be when she wakes up on Monday, or anything else important
about the original case. Note also that they ensure that the bookie does not have
any information that Beauty lacks. Otherwise the bookie might be able to use that
information to his advantage in betting. So the bookie will undergo the same procedure
11See e.g. Christensen[7]
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as Beauty, sleeping and waking at the same time, as well as memory erasing Monday
night, if necessary.
Here is a version of Draper and Pust’s diachronic Dutch book argument: The bookie
sells Beauty two bets. On Sunday the bookie sells her a bet for $15 that pays $30 if the
coin lands tails. Beauty considers this fair because on Sunday she has degree of belief
1/2 that the coin lands tails. Beauty and the bookie then go to sleep. On Monday
afternoon, Beauty and the bookie are told that it is Monday. Beauty revises her belief
state. At this point, the bookie sells Beauty a bet for $30z that pays $30 if the coin
lands heads, where z is Beauty’s revised degree of belief that the coin lands heads.
Beauty considers this fair too. If she accepts these bets, then, if z > 1/2, Beauty is
guaranteed to lose. Whether the coin lands heads or tails Beauty loses $15− $30z. (If
z < 1/2 then a different pair of bets will do the trick: On Sunday the bookie sells her
a bet for $15 that pays $30 if the coin lands heads. On Monday, after Beauty and the
bookie are told that it is Monday, the bookie sells Beauty a bet for $30(1 − z) that
pays $30 if the coin lands tails.) Thus, if z 6= 1/2, Beauty is vulnerable to a diachronic
Dutch book. And, we can see, if z = 1/2 then Beauty comes out even, and thus avoids
this Dutch book. So, if Beauty ought not to be vulnerable to a Dutch book, then, after
Beauty is told that it is Monday, she ought to have degree of belief 1/2 that the coin
lands heads.
A further step is needed to reach the thirder view: if P (HEADS) = 1/3 then
the Dutch book is avoided, and if P (HEADS) 6= 1/3 then Beauty is vulnerable
to the Dutch book. This further step seems plausible, if we suppose that when
Beauty learns that it is Monday, she updates her belief by conditionalization, that
is, if we suppose that z = P (HEADS|MON). The thirders we have discussed all
hold that P (HEADS) = P (HMON ) = P (TMON ) = P (TTUE) = 1/3. So P (MON) =
P (HMON )+P (TMON ) = 2/3, and thus P (HEADS|MON) = P (HMON )/P (MON) =
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(1/3)/(2/3) = 1/2. So these thirders avoid the Dutch book.12 The halfer, as defended
by David Lewis[22], thinks that P (HEADS) = P (HMON ) = 1/2, and P (TMON ) =
P (TTUE) = 1/4. So, P (MON) = P (HMON )+P (TMON ) = 3/4, and P (HEADS|MON) =
P (HMON )/P (MON) = (1/2)/(3/4) = 2/3. So the Lewisian halfer faces this Dutch
book.
However, it is not only a thirder who can avoid Draper and Pust’s Dutch book.
The optimist halfer avoids it too. According to the optimist halfer, P (HEADS) = 1/2
and P (MON) = 1. So P (HEADS|MON) = 1/2.13,14
12Notice that any thirder who accepts that P (HEADS|MON) = 1/2 must hold that P (MON) < 1. For
if P (HEADS|MON) = 1/2 then P (HMON ) = P (TMON ). So, since, P (HEADS) = P (HMON ) = 1/3,
P (MON) = 2/3.
13Hitchcock[14] presents a different Dutch book argument against the halfer view: On Sunday Beauty
pays $15 for a bet that yields $30 if tails, and whenever she wakes up she pays $10 for a bet that yields $20
if heads. If the coin lands heads she loses $15 on Sunday and gains $10 on Monday for a net loss of $5. If
the coin lands tails she gains $15 on Sunday and loses $10 on both Monday and Tuesday for a net loss of
$5. This argument is criticized by both Bradley and Leitgeb[6] and by Draper and Pust. Draper and Pust
rightly point out that (at least on evidential decision theory) the halfer should not consider the bets offered
when she wakes to be fair. That is easy to see in the case of optimist halfer Beauty. Since optimist halfer
Beauty is certain that it is Monday whenever she wakes, she is certain that if she were to accept the bet
today she would accept it tomorrow (if awakened). So she is certain that if she accepts the bet then if the
coin lands heads she wins $10, and if the coin lands tails she loses $10 both today and tomorrow. That means
the expected value of the bet is P (HEADS) ∗ $10 + P (TAILS) ∗ (−$20) = .5 ∗ $10− .5 ∗ $20 = −$5. Since
the expected value is less than 0 the bet is not fair. Even some causal decision theorists may agree, because
(1) Beauty’s activities on Monday do in some way causally influence the state of the world on Tuesday and
(2) When she wakes Beauty is certain that if she were to accept the bet today she would accept it tomorrow
(if awakened).
14One might think that there is a simple diachronic Dutch book against the optimist halfer’s view that
P (MON) = 1 because with that degree of belief Beauty would bet at any odds that it is Monday. An
audience member at a conference suggested the following. Since Beauty is certain that it is Monday whenever
she wakes, on both Monday and Tuesday (if awakened) she should be willing to pay $30 for a bet that yields
$40 if it is Monday. But then one can guarantee a sure loss by adding another bet on Sunday: pay $15 for
a bet that yields $30 if the coin lands tails. Whether the coin lands heads or tails Beauty is sure to lose.
If the coin lands heads she loses $15 on the Sunday bet and gains $10 on the Monday bet for a net loss of
$5. If the coin lands tails she gains $15 on the Sunday bet and $10 on the Monday bet, but loses $30 on the
Tuesday bet, for a net loss of $5.
This Dutch book argument is problematic for reasons similar to those in the previous footnote. Beauty
would not accept the bets on Monday and Tuesday as fair. Whenever she awakes, she is certain that it
is Monday, so she is also certain that if she accepts the bet today she will gain $10. However, she is
also certain that, if the coin lands tails, if she accepts today she will accept the same bet tomorrow and
lose $30. So, since she has degree of belief .5 that the coin lands heads, the expected value of this bet is
.5 ∗ $10 + .5 ∗ ($10 − $30) = −$5. The expected value of the bet is less than 0, so it is not fair (at least
according to evidential decision theory and possibly some versions of causal decision theory as well.)
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7 An argument for optimism
We have now seen the best available arguments for the thirder view, and where, in
the optimist’s view, these arguments go wrong. It is now time to argue in favor of
optimism. Two premises entail that P (MON) = 1: (1) P (HEADS/MON) = 1/2;
(2) P (HEADS) = 1/2.15
We have just seen two explicit arguments for (1), the Dutch book argument in the
previous section, and the following argument by Elga: after Beauty is told that it is
Monday, her degree of belief that the coin lands heads should be 1/2, for her degree of
belief that the coin lands heads should be the same as the chance of the future event
that the coin lands heads. But when she is told that it is Monday, Beauty should revise
her degrees of belief by conditionalization. In particular, her new degree of belief that
HEADS should be P (HEADS/MON).
Now recall the apparently compelling halfer reasoning in favor of (2): Since Beauty
knew that the coin was fair, on Sunday she should have degree of belief 1/2 that the
coin lands heads. When Beauty awakens on Monday she learns nothing relevant to the
coin toss. She does learn that she is awake, but surely that news is not relevant to the
coin toss. Moreover, she has no cognitive mishap between Sunday and Monday, and
does not forget anything or lose relevant evidence in some other way. So, by inertia,
when she wakes up she should continue to have degree of belief 1/2 that the coin lands
heads.
Optimists conclude from (1) and (2) that P (MON) = 1. There are strong argu-
ments in favor of (1) and (2), and (1) and (2) together entail P (MON) = 1. Such is
the compelling reasoning for the optimist view that P (MON) = 1.
Thirders disagree. Thirders accept (1) but think P (MON) < 1. So thirders would
15It follows that P (HEADS) = P (HEADS/MON) = P (HEADS&MON)/P (MON). But
P (HEADS&MON) = P (HEADS). So P (HEADS) = P (HEADS)/P (MON), and thus P (MON) = 1.
(This reasoning requires that P (MON) > 0, but this must be so since P (HEADS/MON) = 1/2.)
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take the optimist argument as a reductio showing that (2) is false, and conclude there-
fore that Beauty gains or loses relevant evidence (or both) when she awakes, or else
inertia is false.
Which reasoning should we accept, the optimist’s or the thirder’s? The optimist’s
reasoning relies on the premise that Beauty neither gains nor loses relevant evidence
when she awakes. The conclusion of this reasoning, P (MON) = 1, is surprising.
Thirders, as we have seen, hold that P (MON) < 1. Thirders conclude, surprisingly,
that Beauty gains relevant evidence when she awakes, or loses relevant evidence, or,
even more surprisingly, that inertia is false. In short: thirders claim that P (MON) <
1, and conclude that Beauty gains or loses relevant evidence (or conclude, less plausibly,
that inertia is false); optimists claim that Beauty does not gain or lose relevant
evidence, and conclude that P (MON) = 1. Thirders and optimists both start with an
intuitive claim, and reach a counterintuitive conclusion. It is intuitive that P (MON) <
1. (Wouldn’t Beauty wonder what day it is? Wouldn’t she learn something if she is
told that it is Monday?) However it is counterintuitive that on Monday she gains
or loses evidence relevant to the coin flip. (How can what she learns on Monday be
relevant to the coin flip? And how can she lose relevant evidence? She doesn’t forget
anything or have a cognitive mishap— how can she lose relevant evidence in some other
way?) On the other side, it is intuitive that what she learns on Monday is not relevant
to the coin flip and it is intuitive that she doesn’t lose any evidence– much less lose
evidence relevant to the coin flip. But it is counterintuitive that P (MON) = 1. As
far as intuitions go, the optimist’s reasoning and the thirder’s reasoning are on a par,
with intuitive premises and a counterintuitive conclusion. Moreover the optimist and
the thirder accept the same principles: belief revision by simple conditionalization,
the Principal Principle, and (at least most thirders anyway) inertia. Thus, as far
as intuitions and principles go, the optimist argument is at least as persuasive as any
thirder argument we have seen. In itself that is an interesting conclusion— until now
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the optimist view has been rejected by all without discussion.
Indeed, further consideration tips the balance in favor of the optimist’s argument.
Notwithstanding numerous thirder arguments, convincing to many, the Sleeping Beauty
problem continues to rankle. Despite the thirder arguments, it is still difficult to believe
that Beauty learns something relevant to the coin flip when she awakes on Monday.
Beauty learns that she is awake, but she already knew on Sunday that she would learn
that. What does she learn that is relevant to the coin flip? Moreover, it is difficult to
believe that Beauty loses evidence relevant to the coin flip. She does not forgot anything
between Sunday and Monday. She suffers no cognitive mishaps. What evidence does
she lose and how does she lose it?
It does not look promising to claim that Beauty gains or loses relevant evidence.
Even so, some thirders do claim so and attempt to explain how it is that Beauty gains
or loses relevant evidence. Let us next explore the most serious of such attempts. They
are, as we will see, unsuccessful.
7.1 Does Beauty gain relevant evidence when she awakes?
The most developed attempt to explain how Beauty learns something relevant to the
coin flip is due to Horgan.[16][17] According to Horgan, Beauty learns “I was awakened
today by the experimenters”, and this information is relevant to the coin flip. Horgan
tries to isolate the effect of what Beauty learns by partitioning the current information
that she has on Monday after being awakened. When Beauty wakes up on Monday, she
first assigns preliminary probabilities relative to a portion of her current information.
This portion of her current information excludes the information that she was awakened
today by the experimenters and also excludes the information that she is awake right
now. The portion includes the information about the situation that Beauty had on
Sunday and continues to have on Monday, and also includes the information that
today is either Monday or Tuesday.[16, 53] According to Horgan, HMON , TMON , HTUE
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and TTUE are all consistent with and equally well supported by that portion of her
current information. Since, he argues, these four possibilities are mutually exclusive
and exhaustive, the preliminary probabilities should be: P−(HMON ) = P−(TMON ) =
P−(HTUE) = P−(TTUE) = 1/4. And thus the preliminary probability of HEADS is
P−(HMON ) + P−(HTUE) = 1/2.
Next, according to Horgan, Beauty should update her preliminary probabilities
by conditionalization on the information that she has been awakened today. That
information (together with what she knows about the experiment) rules out HTUE .
Conditionalizing on this information yields: P (HMON ) = P (TMON ) = P (TTUE) =
1/3, and so P (HEADS) = P (HMON ) = 1/3. On this view, what Beauty learns when
she wakes is relevant to the coin flip because it lowers the preliminary probability 1/2
of HEADS to the updated probability 1/3.
It is unclear to me whether this two-stage framework is a generalization of standard
Bayesian conditionalization (as Horgan suggests) or is instead a departure from it. But
let us accept the framework for the sake of argument. Even so, the proposal fails. A
minor addition to the Sleeping Beauty story will help show why. Suppose that on
Sunday a poster advertising a performance of the ballet Sleeping Beauty is hanging on
the door outside Beauty’s room in the experimental laboratory. The poster will remain
on the door at least until Monday evening. The poster cannot be seen by Beauty from
inside the room. If the coin lands tails, the poster remains on the door throughout
the experiment. However, if the coin lands heads, the poster is removed on Monday
evening at midnight while Beauty is sleeping, and then returned to its place twenty-four
hours later, as Beauty continues to sleep. Beauty is certain of all of this. On Sunday,
before she enters the room, she sees the poster on the door and she is certain that the
poster is on the door. Throughout the experiment she will continue to be certain that
the poster is on the door. Note that the addition of the poster does not matter for any
18
of the thirder arguments discussed earlier.16
In Horgan’s framework, Beauty’s preliminary probabilities on Monday are deter-
mined relative to a portion of her current information which includes the information
about the situation that Beauty had on Sunday and continues to have on Monday, and
also includes the information that today is either Monday or Tuesday. Two pieces of
information that Beauty has on Sunday and continues to have on Monday are: (a) the
poster is on the door, and (b) on Tuesday, if the coin lands heads, the poster is not
on the door. From this information, it follows that HTUE is ruled out, and therefore
the preliminary probability of HTUE is 0. That means that what Beauty learns when
she wakes is not relevant to HEADS; updating her preliminary probabilities by con-
ditionalization on the information that she has been awakened today has no effect on
the probability of HMON and thus no effect on the probability of HEADS.
Horgan may respond by excluding the information that the poster is on the door
from the portion of her information used to calculate her preliminary probabilities.
But that response does not work.17 A second response is to hold that while poster
16For example, if the arguments mentioned for the thirder premise that P (HEADS/MON) = 1/2 work
for the original story, they work for the poster version. Being certain that the poster is on the door doesn’t
change whether Beauty is subject to Draper and Pust’s diachronic Dutch book. Being certain that the poster
is on the door doesn’t affect Elga’s reasoning based on the claim that if, on Monday, Beauty learns that it
is Monday, she ought to have degree of belief 1/2 that the coin lands heads.
17To see why, consider the effort of Pust[27], who also argues against Horgan that Beauty’s preliminary
probability in HTUE is 0. Pust relies on the claim that it is not possible for Beauty to be in an epistemic
situation in which she lacks the information that she is presently conscious. Horgan’s reply, in effect, is to
exclude her information that she is presently conscious from the portion of her current information used to
determine her preliminary probabilities. Horgan imagines Beauty saying to herself on Monday, “Statements
HMON , HTUE , TMON , and TTUE are all consistent with the conjunction of (1) the information I had on
Sunday and with (2) the information that today is either Monday or Tuesday. In particular, statement
HTUE is consistent with that specific information—notwithstanding the fact that if HTUE were true, then
today I would not be conscious. So, relative to the information just mentioned, and only that information,
the four statements each have the same degree of evidential support.”[17] (The names of the possibilities are
changed to match the present paper.) Horgan does not explicitly say why he excludes Beauty’s information
that she is presently conscious. Presumably he thinks that Beauty’s (Monday) information that she is
presently conscious is not information that she had on Sunday. Or perhaps he thinks that the information
that Beauty is presently conscious should be excluded because that information (given the description of the
case) entails that she has been awakened today, and the information that she has been awakened today is
already excluded. Either way, Horgan has no such grounds to exclude the information that the poster is on
the door. Beauty has and continues to have the information that the poster is on the door from Sunday to
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Beauty does not gain any relevant information, standard Beauty does. But that second
response is inadequate too: it would leave a thirder about poster Beauty with no
explanation why her degree of belief in HEADS should change, and it would leave a
halfer about poster Beauty with the challenge of explaining why the addition of the
poster should make a difference to Beauty’s degree of belief in HEADS, when that
addition does not affect the force of the thirder arguments discussed earlier.
Horgan’s proposal aside, the poster case highlights a challenge facing any attempt to
show that when she learns that she is awake she gains information relevant to HEADS.
In the poster version Beauty is certain that the poster is on the door and she remains
certain that the poster is on the door throughout the experiment. Similarly, it seems,
in the standard version, not only is she certain, on Sunday, that “Today is Tuesday and
the coin lands heads” is false, throughout the experiment she remains certain that this
sentence is false. But on Monday, certainty that “Today is Tuesday and the coin lands
heads” is false is sufficient to rule out HTUE . So the information that she is awake is
not needed to rule out HTUE . But then how could learning that she is awake be in any
way relevant to HEADS?18
Monday, and that information does not entail that she has been awakened today– the poster is also on the
door on Monday while she is sleeping before being awakened. In essence, the problem for Horgan’s view is
that on Sunday Beauty already had information which, on Monday, suffices to rule out HTUE ; on Monday
she can rule out HTUE without using the information that she has been awakened today.
Someone might suggest that the information conveyed on Sunday using “The poster is on the door” differs
from the information conveyed on Monday using “The poster is on the door”: the former describes the
location of the poster on Sunday and the latter describes the location of the poster on Monday. But this
suggestion does not help Horgan. Beauty has the information that the poster is on the door throughout the
experiment, even if the nature of this information changes over time. We can put it this way: throughout
the experiment she will remain certain that the sentence “The poster is on the door” is true even if the
information conveyed by a use of this sentence changes over time. Note that she may need to be awake in
order to fix the reference of the indexical “today” or the present tense “The poster is on the door” and thus
she may need to be awake on Monday in order to eliminate HTUE on Monday. But that does not mean that
she needs to use the information that she has been awakened (or that she is awake) to eliminate HTUE .
18She may need to be awake in order to fix the reference of an indexical like “today” in “Today is Tuesday
and the coin lands heads”, but that does not mean that she needs to use the information that she is awake
in order to fix the reference of “today” or to eliminate HTUE .
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7.2 Does Beauty lose relevant evidence when she awakes?
Thus, the best developed attempt to show that Beauty gains relevant evidence does
not succeed. The thirder might instead pursue another option: Beauty loses relevant
evidence.19 This approach is not promising either. Between Sunday and Monday,
Beauty does not forget anything, and she suffers no cognitive mishaps. Unless there is
some other way to lose evidence, Beauty does not lose any.
Perhaps there is another way to lose evidence. The Shangri-La example (due to
Arntzenius[1]) has been thought by some to show how:
You will travel to Shangri-La by one of two paths, the Path by the Mountain
or the Path by the Sea. Which path you take is determined by the flip of a
fair coin. If the coin lands heads you travel on the Path by the Mountain;
if the coin lands tails you travel on the Path by the Sea. However, the
guardians of Shangri-La have arranged it so that if the coin lands tails
and you travel via the sea, you don’t remember doing so: when you pass
through the gates of Shangri-La, your memories of traveling by the sea are
wiped out, and replaced by apparent memories of having traveled through
the mountains. On the other hand, if the coin lands heads and you go via
the mountains, nothing untoward happens and you enter the city with your
memories intact. Before you set off, all the arrangements are known with
certainty by you.
Before the coin is flipped, according to the Principal Principle, you should have
degree of belief 1/2 that the coin lands heads. Now suppose the coin lands heads
and you travel by the mountains. As you are traveling, we can agree, you should
be certain that the coin landed heads because you see the enjoyable mountain scene.
Then, according to Arntzenius, after entering Shangri-La your degree of belief that
the coin landed heads should be 1/2 again: “... once you have arrived, you will revert
to having degree of belief 1/2 in heads. For you will know that you would have had
the memories that you have either way, and hence you know that the only relevant
19The two options do not exclude each other; the thirder might claim that Beauty both gains and loses
relevant evidence. But if Beauty does not gain relevant evidence she does not both gain and lose relevant
evidence.
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information that you have is that the coin was fair.”[1][p 356]20
If this is right, then if the coin lands heads you might be said to lose information
upon passing through the gates of the city. Just before the gates you are certain that
the coin landed heads and you are certain that you traveled through the mountains.
After passing through the gates you are no longer certain of these things. This loss
of certainty, one might say, is (or indicates) a loss of information. But you do not
forget anything and you do not suffer any cognitive mishaps. Apparently then there
is different a way to lose information- a way different from forgetting or suffering a
cognitive mishap. The mere threat of being in the counterfactual situation where the
coin lands tails and forgetting/disruption occurs seems to be enough to bring about
this loss. Perhaps Beauty loses information in some such way; perhaps the threat
of the possible memory erasure Monday evening is enough to bring about a loss of
information about what day it is.
However, the Shangri-La case does not show how to lose information in a way dif-
ferent from forgetting or cognitive mishap. Arntzenius claims that, if the coin lands
heads, after passing through the gate you should change from degree of belief 1 to
degree of belief 1/2 that the coin landed heads. But this claim is incompatible with
the Bayesian principle that belief updating (for non-indexical propositions) should only
occur by conditionalization. Given that principle, after passing through the gate you
should continue to have credence 1 that the coin landed heads. For once you have
credence 1 that the coin landed heads, your credence cannot be lowered by condition-
alization. Indeed, intuitively, the principle yields the correct result in this case. Why
should you reduce your credence in the truth that the coin landed heads because an
unfortunate event would have occurred if the coin had instead landed tails?
On the other hand, there is some intuitive appeal to the view that your degree of
20Although Arntzenius says you will revert to degree of belief 1/2, I take it that he also holds that you
should revert to degree of belief 1/2.
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belief should revert to 1/2 after passing through the gates. (Imagine yourself in that
situation. Wouldn’t you doubt whether your memories are accurate?) But principled
commitment to Bayesian principles should not stand or fall on the basis of mere in-
tuitive appeal— especially given the countervailing intuition that you should not give
up your certainty in the truth that the coin landed heads because something untoward
would have happened to you if the things had been different.
Arntzenius is of course aware that his view of the Shangri-La case conflicts with
standard Bayesian principles. However mere intuition is not the justification he gives
for his view. There you are before the gates. The coin landed heads and you are
certain that it did. Then you pass through the gates. Arntzenius’s suggestion seems
to be that you should now ignore your evidence that the coin landed heads because
you know that you would have had the same evidence whether the coin landed heads
or the coin landed tails.21 But this way of reasoning is suspicious at best. Compare
the following. You are, I take it, certain that you are awake right now. But suppose
you start thinking about what it is like when you are dreaming and you realize that
you would have had the same evidence whether you are awake or you are asleep having
a particularly vivid dream. At that point, should you then ignore your evidence that
you are awake? No. Surely it would be a mistake at that point to ignore your evidence
that you are awake. For you are certain that you are not asleep; you are certain that
you are not in the counterfactual situation where you are asleep having a particularly
vivid dream. Learning the interesting fact that you would have had the same evidence
in a certain counterfactual situation should not bring you to stop being certain that
that situation is counterfactual.22
21This is the best sense I can make of the remark quoted earlier: “ ... you will know that you would have
had the memories that you have either way, and hence you know that the only relevant information that you
have is that the coin was fair.”
22The point here is simply that you should not, on the basis of discovering that you would have had the
same evidence if you were dreaming, accept the conclusion that you should ignore your evidence that you
are awake. We can save the problem of explaining what exactly is wrong with this reasoning for later. Here
is another example of similar suspicious reasoning: The wall is painted red, and on Monday morning you
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One can say something similar about Shangri-La. At the gates of Shangri-La, after
the coin landed heads, you are certain that the coin landed heads, and you are certain
that you are not in the counterfactual situation where the coin landed tails. Then
you pass through the gates. On the other side of the gates, you learn an interesting
fact about the counterfactual situation in which the coin landed tails. You learn that
the evidence you have at that point is the same (or at least appears the same) as the
evidence you would have had in the counterfactual situation in which the coin landed
tails. You should not then ignore your evidence that the coin landed heads. For you
are certain that you are not in the counterfactual situation in which coin landed tails.
You have merely learned an interesting fact about that counterfactual situation.23
Neither mere intuition nor Arntzenius’ suspicious reasoning should sway us from
principle: when the coin lands heads, you should continue to be certain that the coin
landed heads after passing through the gates of Shangri-La.24 Thus the Shangri-La
case does not provide good reason to think there is a way to lose evidence different
from forgetting or suffering a cognitive mishap. So that case provides no good reason
to think that Beauty loses evidence.
are certain that it is painted red. As you know, in a nearby room there is a white wall with a red light
shining on it, but you are certain that you are not in that nearby room. It would be a mistake to ignore
your evidence that the wall is painted red, even if you come to know on Monday evening that you would
have had the same evidence whether you are in the red painted room or the red lighted room. For you are
certain that you are not in the nearby room. Your certainty should not be shaken by the discovery of the
interesting fact that you would have had the same evidence in some counterfactual situation.
23Perhaps behind Arntzenius’s reasoning is a principle like this: if you have the same evidence that p in
situation S as you have in situation S’, then you should have the same degree of belief that p in situation
S and situation S’. Even if this principle is correct, it is not sufficient to show that you should have degree
of belief 1/2 that the coin lands heads after passing through the gates. It is compatible with this principle
that you have degree of belief 1 that the coin lands heads after passing through the gates whether the coin
lands heads or tails.
24As far as I know this view of the Shangri-La case has not yet found a defender in print— although
Wolfgang Schwarz apparently advocated it in a talk.
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7.3 On the optimist side
Earlier, we saw that as far as intuition and principles go, the reasoning of optimists and
the reasoning of thirders are on a par. Thirders and optimists both start with an intu-
itive claim, and reach a counterintuitive conclusion. Thirders claim that P (MON) < 1,
and conclude that Beauty gains or loses relevant evidence (or conclude, less plausibly,
that inertia is false); optimists claim that Beauty does not gain or lose relevant evi-
dence, and conclude that P (MON) = 1.
The last section investigated the most plausible attempt to show how Beauty can
lose relevant evidence. The section before last examined the most developed attempt
to show that Beauty gains relevant evidence. We found no good reason to believe that
Beauty either gains or loses relevant evidence. This strongly supports the optimist’s
claim that Beauty does not gain or lose relevant evidence, given the lack of any better
proposals to explain how Beauty can gain or lose relevant evidence. These considera-
tions thus tip the balance in favor of the optimist’s argument over the thirder’s. One
should follow the argument where it leads, and conclude that P (MON) = 1.
However, there is a lingering issue. The optimist’s conclusion, P (MON) = 1, is
not easy to believe. When one imagines oneself in Beauty’s position upon awakening
on Monday, one imagines that one would feel uncertain about what day it is. It is easy
to think that Beauty should be uncertain about what day it is when she awakes on
Monday.
However, the optimist can help make the claim that P (MON) = 1 easier to accept.
The optimist can explain why one might mistakenly believe that P (MON) < 1. The
explanation is that one is attracted to something like the following thought:
Because of the memory erasure, Beauty cannot distinguish Monday wakings
from Tuesday wakings. When she awakes on Monday, she has no evidence
that indicates to her that it is Monday as opposed to Tuesday. So, on
Monday, surely she should give at least some credence to the proposition
that it is now Tuesday.
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It is understandable that this sort of thought might lead one to believe that P (MON) <
1. But, again, there is a striking similarity to a skeptical thought:
I cannot distinguish an experience had while awake from particularly vivid
dream experiences had while asleep; I have no evidence that indicates to
me that I am awake now as opposed to being asleep having one of those
particularly vivid dreams. So surely I should give at least some credence to
the proposition that I am asleep right now.
It is understandable that this sort of thought might lead me to uncertainty whether
I am awake now. Many have been attracted to skeptical thoughts. However, while
attractive, the skeptical thought is mistaken. I am certain that I am awake right now,
and surely it is rational for me to be certain that I am awake right now. Despite
recognizing that the thought is mistaken (we can figure out why another day) the
skeptical thought retains an illusory air of cogency.
Similarly, says the optimist, the thought about Beauty is mistaken. On Monday,
Beauty should be certain that it is Monday. But, as in the skeptical case, even after
recognizing that the thought is mistake, the illusory air of cogency persists.25
8 Conclusion
I have considered the best thirder arguments I am aware of: by Elga, by Arntzenius and
Dorr, by Titelbaum, and by Draper and Pust. I have explained how these arguments
each require that P (MON) < 1. Therefore, if P (MON) = 1, these arguments should
25Is there is a quick way to show that although the skeptical thought is mistaken the thought about Beauty
is not mistaken? One might say that although I have overwhelming evidence that I am awake now, Beauty
(on Monday) does not have overwhelming evidence that it is Monday. But this suggestion fails. On Monday,
Beauty does have overwhelming evidence that it is Monday– she is filled with memories of the happenings
on Sunday, memories, as she would put it, about “yesterday”. One might reply that she does not have
overwhelming evidence that it is Monday because (1) she should doubt that her memory is reliable because
if it is Tuesday she would have indistinguishable (apparent) memories, and (2) doubt about the reliability
of her memory undermines or defeats her evidence that today is Monday. But then parallel points would
seem to apply to the dreaming case: I do not have overwhelming evidence that I am awake because (1) I
should doubt that my experiences reliably indicate that I am awake because if I am asleep I would have
indistinguishable experiences, and (2) doubt about the reliability of my experience undermines or defeats
my evidence that I am awake.
26
not be accepted. I have also argued that P (MON) = 1. Thus, the thirder arguments
should not be accepted. The path is clear to be a halfer.
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